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1. Introduction     
Although the impact of e-mail spam has been greatly reduced by existing spam filters, spam 
remains a great challenge to Internet Service Providers and the average user. Given that 
there are millions of e-mail users, profit-driven spammers have great incentives to spam. 
With as little as 0.001% response rate, a spammer could potentially profit $25,000 on a $50 
product (Carpinter and Hunt, 2006). Over the years, spammers have grown in sophistication 
with cutting-edge technologies and have become more evasive. The best evidence of their 
growing effectiveness is a recent estimate of over US $10 billion worldwide spam-related 
cost in terms of wasted resources and lost productivity (Jennings, 2005). The spam problem 
has been generally accepted as a long lasting problem, unlikely to end anytime soon. 
Spam filtering has become an extensively studied subject due to the severity of the spam 
problem. However, relatively little research has been done on countering adversarial attacks 
on existing spam filtering systems. In recent years, adversarial attacks have become an 
increasing challenge to the anti-spam community. Common adversarial attacks on spam 
filters are exploratory attacks. These attacks attempt to discover ways to disguise spam 
messages so that spam filters are unable to correctly detect them. However, the adversary 
who initiates this type of attacks has no intention to influence or alter the training process of 
spam filters that are the targets of attack. The good word attack (Lowd and Meek, 2005b) is 
one of the most popular exploratory attacks employed by spammers. This technique 
involves appending to spam messages sets of “good” words that are common to legitimate 
e-mails (ham) but rare in spam. Spam messages injected with good words are more likely to 
bypass spam filters. So far, relatively little research has been done on how spam filters can 
be trained to account for such attacks. This chapter presents an effective defence strategy, 
using instance differentiation and multiple instance (MI) learning, against spam disguised 
with good words.  
Multiple instance (MI) learning (Dietterich et al., 1997) differs from single instance 
supervised learning in that an example is represented by a set, or bag, of instances rather 
than as just a single instance. The bag is assigned a class label (either positive or negative) 
based on the instances it contains; however, the instances within the bag are not necessarily 
labelled. Classic MI learning assumes that a bag is positive if at least one instance in the bag 
is positive and negative if all instances are negative. Therefore, the goal of multiple instance 
learning is to learn a classification function that accurately maps a given bag to a class. 
www.intechopen.com
 Tools in Artificial Intelligence 
 
474 
Our spam filtering strategy adopts the classical MI assumption. Each e-mail is transformed  
into a bag of instances. An e-mail is classified as spam if at least one instance in the 
corresponding bag is spam, and as legitimate if all the instances in it are legitimate. The 
other integral component of our defence strategy is the model for instance differentiation, 
i.e., dividing an e-mail into a bag of multiple instances. The challenge of defining such a 
model includes finding a clean separation between the spam content and the good words 
that are common to legitimate e-mail, and ensuring that the model itself does not introduce 
a loophole for adversarial attacks. With an effective instance differentiation model, we can 
split each e-mail into multiple instances so that even when spam is injected with good 
words, a multiple instance learner is still able to recognize the spam part of the message.  
In this chapter, an overview of recent research in the area of adversarial learning and 
multiple instance learning is provided. The models for performing instance differentiation 
and multiple instance learning are presented and investigated. Experimental results are 
given to show that a multiple instance learner stands up better to good word attacks than its 
single instance counterpart and the commonly practiced Bayesian filters. Then further 
development and future directions for this research are discussed. 
2. Related work 
Our work is primarily motivated by recent research on adversarial learning (Dalvi et al., 
2004; Lowd & Meek, 2005a; Kolter & Maloof, 2005). Dalvi et al. (2004) consider classification 
to be a game between classifiers and adversaries in problem domains where adversarial 
attacks are expected. They model the computation of the adversary’s optimal strategy as a 
constrained optimization problem and approximate its solution based on dynamic 
programming. Subsequently, an optimal classifier is produced against the optimal 
adversarial strategy. Their experimental results demonstrate that their game-theoretic 
approach outperforms traditional classifiers in the spam filtering domain. However, in their 
adversarial classification framework, they assume both the classifier and the adversary have 
perfect knowledge of each other, which is unrealistic in practice. 
Instead of assuming the adversary has perfect knowledge of the classifier, Lowd & Meek 
(2005a) formalized the task of adversarial learning as the process of reverse engineering the 
classifier. In their adversarial classifier reverse engineer (ACRE) framework, the adversary 
aims to identify difficult spam instances (the ones that are hard to detect by the classifier) 
through membership queries. The goal is to find a set of negative instances with minimum 
adversarial cost within a polynomial number of membership queries. Newsome et al. (2006) 
emphasize the point that the training data used to build classifiers for spam filtering and the 
similar problem of internet worm detection is, to a large extent, controlled by an adversary. 
They describe and demonstrate several attacks on the generators of such classifiers in which 
the adversary is able to significantly impair the learning of accurate classifiers by 
manipulating the training data, even while still providing correct labels for the training 
instances. The attacks involve inserting features, in a specific manner, into one or both 
classes of the training data and are specifically designed to cause a significant increase in 
false positives or false negatives for the resulting classifier. They conclude that the 
generation of classifiers for adversarial environments should take into account the fact that 
training data is controlled by an adversarial source in order to ensure the production of 
accurate classifiers. 
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Barreno et al. (2006) explore possible adversarial attacks on machine learning algorithms 
from multiple perspectives. They present a taxonomy of different types of attacks on 
machine learning systems. An attack is causative if it targets the training data, and is 
exploratory if it aims to discover information through, for example, offline analysis. An attack 
is targeted if it focuses on a small set of points, and is indiscriminate if it targets a general class 
of points. An integrity attack leads to false negatives, and an availability attack aims to cause 
(machine learning) system dysfunction by generating many false negatives and false 
positives. They also discuss several potential defences against those attacks, and give a 
lower bound on the adversary’s effort in attacking a naïve learning algorithm. 
A practical example of adversarial learning is learning in the presence of the good word 
attack. Lowd & Meek (2005b) present and evaluate several variations of this type of attack 
on spam filters. They demonstrate two different ways to carry out the attack: passively and 
actively. Active good word attacks use feedback obtained by sending test messages to a 
spam filter in order to determine which words are “good”. The active attacks were found to 
be more effective than the passive attacks; however, active attacks are generally more 
difficult than passive attacks because they require user-level access to the spam filter, which 
is not always possible. Passive good word attacks, on the other hand, do not involve any 
feedback from the spam filter, but rather, guesses are made as to which words are 
considered good. Three common ways for passively choosing good words are identified. 
First, dictionary attacks involve selecting random words from a large collection of words, 
such as a dictionary. In testing, this method did not prove to be effective; in fact, it actually 
increased the chances that the e-mail would be classified as spam. Next, frequent word attacks 
involve the selection of words that occur most often in legitimate messages, such as news 
articles. This method was more effective than the previous one, but it still required as many 
as 1,000 good words to be added to the original message. Finally, frequency ratio attacks 
involve the selection of words that occur very often in legitimate messages but not in spam 
messages. The authors’ tests showed that this technique was quite effective, resulting in the 
average spam message being passed off as legitimate by adding as few as 150 good words to 
it. Preliminary results were also presented that suggested that frequent retraining on 
attacked messages may help reduce the effect of good word attacks on spam filters. 
Webb et al. (2005) also examined the effectiveness of good word attacks on statistical spam 
filters. They present a “large-scale evaluation” of the effectiveness of the attack on four spam 
filters: naïve Bayes, support vector machine (SVM), LogitBoost, and Spam-Probe. Their 
experiments were performed on a large e-mail corpus consisting of around a million spam 
and ham messages, which they formed by combining several public and private corpora. 
Such a large and diverse corpus more closely simulates the environment of a server-level 
spam filter than a client-level filter. The experimental results show that, on normal e-mail, 
i.e., e-mail that has not been modified with good words, each of the filters is able to attain an 
accuracy as high as 98%. When testing on “camouflaged messages”, however, the accuracies 
of the filters drop to between 50% and 75%. In their experiments, spam e-mails were 
camouflaged by combining them with portions of legitimate messages. They experimented 
with camouflaged messages containing twice as much spam content as legitimate content, 
and vice versa. They also proposed and demonstrated a possible solution to the attack. By 
training on a collection of e-mails consisting of half normal and half camouflaged messages, 
and treating all camouflaged messages as spam, they were able to improve the accuracy of 
the filters when classifying camouflaged messages. 
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Our counterattack strategy against good word attacks is inspired by work in the field of 
multiple instance (MI) learning. The concept of MI learning was initially proposed by 
Dietterich et al. (1997) for predicting drug activities. The challenge of identifying a drug 
molecule that binds strongly to a target protein is that a drug molecule can have multiple 
conformations, or shapes. A molecule is positive if at least one of its conformations binds 
tightly to the target, and negative if none of its conformations bind well to the target. The 
problem was tackled with an MI model that aims to learn axis-parallel rectangles (APR). 
Later, learning APR in the multiple instance setting was further studied and proved to be 
NP-complete by several other researchers in the PAC-learning framework (Auer, 1997; Long 
and Tan, 1998; Blum and Kalai, 1998).  
Several probabilistic models: diverse density (DD) (Maron & Lozano-Pérez, 1998) and its 
variation EM-DD (Zhang & Goldman, 2002), and multiple instance logistic regression 
(MILR) (Ray & Craven, 2005), employ a maximum likelihood estimation to solve problems 
in the MI domain. The original DD algorithm searches for the target concept by finding an 
area in the feature space with maximum diverse density, i.e., an area with a high density of 
positive points and a low density of negative points. The diverse density at a point in the 
feature space is defined to measure probabilistically how many different positive bags have 
instances near that point, and how far the negative instances are from that point. EM-DD 
combines EM with the DD algorithm to reduce the multiple instance learning problem to a 
single-instance setting. The algorithm uses EM to estimate the instance in each bag which is 
most likely to be the one responsible for the label of the bag. The MILR algorithm presented 
by Ray & Craven (2005) is designed to learn linear models in a multiple instance setting. 
Logistic regression is used to model the posterior probability of the label of each instance in 
a bag, and the bag level posterior probability is estimated by using softmax to combine the 
posterior probabilities over the instances of the bag. Similar approaches with different 
combining functions are presented by Xu & Frank (2004). 
Many single-instance learning algorithms have been adapted to solve the multiple instance 
learning problem. For example, Wang & Zucker (2000) propose the lazy MI learning 
algorithms, namely Baysian-kNN and citation-kNN, which solve the multiple instance 
learning problem by using the Hausdorff distance to measure the distance between two 
bags of points in the feature space. Chevaleyre & Zucker (2001) propose the multi-instance 
decision tree ID3-MI and decision rule learner RIPPER-MI by defining a new multiple 
instance entropy function and a multiple instance coverage function. Other algorithms that 
have been adapted to multiple instance learning include the neural network MI-NN (Ramon 
& Raedt, 2000), DD-SVM (Chen & Wang, 2004), MI-SVM and mi-SVM (Andrews et al., 
2003), multi-instance kernels (Gärtner et al., 2002), MI-Ensemble (Zhou & Zhang, 2003), and 
MI-Boosting (Xu & Frank, 2004).  
In this chapter, we demonstrate that a counterattack strategy against good word attacks, 
developed in the framework of multiple instance learning, can be very effective, provided 
that a single instance can be properly transformed into a bag of instances. We also explore 
several possible ways to transform e-mails into bags of instances. Our experiments also 
verify earlier observations, discussed in other works (Lowd & Meek, 2005b; Webb et al., 
2005), that retraining on e-mails modified during adversarial attacks may improve the 
performance of the filters against the attack. 
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3. Problem definition 
Consider a standard supervised learning problem with a set of training data 
},,...,,{ 11 ><><= mm YXYXD , where iX is an instance represented as a single feature vector, 
)( ii XCY =  is the target value of iX , where C is the target function. Normally, the task is to 
learn C given D. The learning task becomes more difficult when there are adversaries who 
could alter some instance  so that 'ii XX →  and cause 'ii YY → , where 'ii YY ≠ . Let iXΔ  be the 
difference between iX  and 
'
iX , i.e., iii XXX Δ+=' . In the case of spam filtering, an 
adversary can modify spam e-mails by injecting them with good words. So, iXΔ  represents 
a set of good words added to a spam message by the spammer. There are two cases that 
need to be studied separately:  
1. the filter is trained on normal e-mails, i.e., e-mails that have not been injected with good 
words, and tested on e-mails which have been injected with good words;  
2. both the training and testing sets contain e-mails injected with good words.  
In the first case, the classifier is trained on a clean training set. Predictions made for the 
altered test instances are highly unreliable. In the second case, the classifier may capture 
some adversarial patterns as long as the adversaries consistently follow a particular pattern. 
In both cases, the problem becomes trivial if we know exactly how the instances are altered; 
we could recover the original data and solve the problem as if no instances were altered by 
the adversary. In reality, knowing exactly how the instances are altered is impossible. 
Instead, we seek to approximately separate iX and iXΔ and treat them as separate instances 
in a bag. We then apply multiple instance learning to learn a hypothesis defined over a set 
of bags. 
4. Multiple instance bag creation 
We now formulate the spam filtering problem as a multiple instance binary classification 
problem in the context of adversarial attacks. Note that the adversary is only interested in 
altering positive instances, i.e., spam, by injecting sets of good words that are commonly 
encountered in negative instances, i.e., legitimate e-mails, or ham. We propose four different 
approaches to creating multiple instance bags from e-mails. We call them split-half (split-H), 
split-term (split-T), split-projection (split-P), and split-subtraction (split-S). We will now 
discuss each of these splitting methods, in turn. 
4.1 Split-H 
In our first splitting method, split-half, we split every e-mail right down the middle into 
approximately equal halves. Formally, let },...,,...,{ mi1 BBBB =  be a set of bags (e-mails), 
where },{ i2i1i XXB =  is the thi  bag, i1X  and i2X  are the two instances in the thi  bag, 
created from the upper half and the lower half of the e-mail respectively. This splitting 
approach is reasonable in practice because spammers usually append a section of good 
words to either the beginning or the end of an e-mail to ensure the legibility of the spam 
message.  
This splitting method, because it relies on the physical positioning of words in an e-mail, 
could potentially be circumvented by the spammer. There are two obvious ways to do this. 
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One is to create a visual pattern with good words so that the original spam message is still 
legible after the attack, but the spam is fragmented in such a way that “spammy” words are 
well separated and become less indicative of spam in the presence of a number of good 
words. The following example demonstrates how this idea can work effectively to 
circumvent this splitting method. 
 
 
 
The second way to defeat the split-H method is to append a very large block of good words 
to an e-mail so that after the split, good words outweigh spam-indicative words in all 
instances. The next three splitting methods do not rely on the positions of the words and 
thus do not suffer from this vulnerability. 
4.2 Split-T 
The second splitting method, split-term (split-T), partitions a message into three groups of 
words (terms) depending on whether the word is an indicator of spam, an indicator of ham, 
or neutral, i.e., },,{ ihinisi XXXB = , where isX  is the spam-likely instance, inX is the neutral 
instance, and ihX  is the ham-likely instance in bag iB . The instance to which each word is 
assigned is based on a weight generated for it during preprocessing. These weights are 
calculated using word frequencies obtained from the spam and legitimate messages in the 
training corpus. More specifically, the weight of a term W is given as follows:  
,
)|()|(
)|(
)(
hs
s
DWpDWp
DWp
Wweight +=  
where sD and hD are the spam and ham e-mails in the training set respectively. When 
splitting an e-mail into instances we used two threshold values, sthresh  and `thresh , to 
determine which instance (spam-likely, ham-likely, or neutral) each word in the e-mail 
should be assigned to. We considered any word with a weight greater than sthresh  to be 
spammy, any word with a weight less than `thresh  to be legitimate, and any word with a 
weight in between to be neutral. Given each training set, sthresh  was selected such that 
some fraction, for example 20%, of the terms chosen during attribute selection (discussed in 
Section 6.1) would have a weight greater than or equal to it. `thresh  was selected so that 
some other fraction, for example 50%,  of the terms would have a weight less than or equal 
to it. Reasonable fractions of terms and threshold values can be determined by using cross 
validation on training e-mails.  
From: foo@internet.org 
To: foo-foo@email.org 
Subject: meeting agenda 
good words    ...        low          ...     good words 
good words    ...    mortgage    ...     good words 
good words    ...       rate          ...     good words 
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4.3 Split-P 
The third splitting method, split-projection (split-P), transforms each message into a bag of 
two instances by projecting the message vector onto the spam and ham prototype vectors. 
The prototype vectors are computed using all the spam and ham messages in the training 
set. If we view the spam and ham messages in the training set as two clusters, then the 
prototypes are essentially the centroid of the two clusters. More specifically, let sC  be the 
set of e-mails that are spam and lC  be the set of e-mails that are legitimate. The prototypes 
are computed using Rocchio’s algorithm (Rocchio Jr., 1971) as follows: 
 
 
where 
is
C  is the thi  spam message in 
s
C  and 
i
C`  is the 
thi  ham message in C` , β is a fixed 
constant suggested to be 16 and γ is a fixed constant suggested to be 4. Given a message M, 
two new instances, 
S
M  and M ` , are formed by projecting M onto sP  and P` :  
s
M =
2| |
s
s
s
M P
P
P
⋅
 
 
The rationale of this splitting approach rests on the assumption that a message is close to the 
spam prototype in terms of cosine similarity if it is indeed spam, and a ham message is close 
to the ham prototype.  
4.3 Split-S 
The last splitting method, split-subtraction (split-S), like the former, uses prototype (centroid) 
vectors. In this method, however, the ham and spam prototypes are calculated by averaging 
the corresponding attribute values of all of the ham and spam e-mails, respectively. 
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where sC  is a set of spam and isC  is the 
thi  spam message in sC ; `C  is a set of ham, and 
i
C`  is the 
thi  ham message in `C . A message can then be transformed from a single instance 
attribute vector M into a bag of two instances by subtracting corresponding attribute values 
in the single instance vector from the ham prototype and the spam prototype, yielding a 
legitimate instance `` PMM −=  and a spam instance ss PMM −= , respectively (Zhang & 
Zhou, 2007). 
Now that we have devised several techniques for creating multiple instance bags from e-
mail messages, we can transform the standard supervised learning problem of spam 
filtering into a multiple instance learning problem under the standard MI assumption. For 
this research, we adopt the multiple instance logistic regression (MILR) model to train a 
spam filter that is more robust to adversarial good word attacks than traditional spam filters 
based on single instance models. We chose to use the MILR classifier over other MI 
classifiers mainly because its single instance counter-part, logistic regression (LR), which has 
been shown to be very effective in the spam filtering domain (Yih et al., 2006), appeared to 
be the best among the single instance learners considered in our experiments. The next 
section outlines the multiple instance logistic regression learning model. 
5. Multiple instance logistic regression 
Given a set of training bags },,,...,,,...,,{ 11 ><><><= mmii YBYBYBB let )|1( ii BYPr =  be the 
probability that the thi bag is positive, and )|0( ii BYPr =  be the probability that it is negative. 
Here iY  is a dichotomous outcome of the 
thi bag (e.g., spam or legitimate). The bag-level 
binomial log-likelihood function is: 
)].|0(log)1()|1(log[
1
iiiiii
m
i
BYPrYBYPrYL =−+==∑
=
 
In a single instance setting where logistic regression is used, given an example X
i
, we model 
the expected value of the dichotomous outcome of X
i
 with a sigmoidal response function, 
i.e., ))exp(1/()exp()|1( bXpbXpXYPr iiii +⋅++⋅== , then estimate the parameters p and b 
that maximize the log-likelihood function. In a multiple instance setting, we do not have direct 
measure of bag-level probabilities in the log-likelihood function. Instead, we estimate the 
instance-level class probabilities )|1( ijij XYPr =  with a sigmoidal response function as follows:  
,
)exp(1
)exp(
)|1(
bXp
bXp
XYPr
ij
ij
ijij +⋅+
+⋅==  
where ijX  is the 
thj instance in the thi  bag, and p and b are the parameters that need to be 
estimated. Thus, )|0( ii BYPr =  with instance-level class probabilities can be computed as 
follows:  
Pr(Yij = 0 | Xij ) = 1− Pr(Yij = 1 | Xij ) =
1
1 + exp(p ⋅ Xij + b )
. 
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Now we can compute the probability that a bag is negative based on the MI assumption that 
a bag is negative if and only if every instance in the bag is negative:  
)|0( ii BYPr = =  )|0(
1
ijij
n
j
XYPr =∏
=
 
                                   =  ))))exp(1(log(exp(
1
bXp ij
n
j
+⋅+−∑
=
, 
where n is the number of instances in the thi  bag. Thus the probability   
 )|0(1)|1( iiii BYPrBYPr =−==  
estimates how likely a bag is positive if at least one instance in the bag is positive. In our 
case, given a set of e-mails for training, ijX  is a vector of the frequency count (or other 
variations such as a tf-idf weight) of unique terms in each e-mail. We can apply maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE) to maximize the bag-level log-likelihood function, and estimate 
the parameters p and b that maximize the probability of observing the bags in B. 
6. Experimental setup 
We evaluated our multiple instance learning counterattack strategy on e-mails from the 2006 
TREC Public Spam Corpus (Cormack & Lynam, 2006). Good word attacks were simulated 
by generating a list of good words from the corpus and injecting them into spam messages 
in the training and/or test data sets. We compared our counterattack strategy, using the 
multiple instance logistic regression model and the four splitting methods introduced 
above, to its single instance learning counterpart—logistic regression (LR)—and to the 
support vector machine (SVM) and the multinomial naïve Bayes (MNB) classifiers.  
6.1 Experimental data 
Our experimental data consists of 36,674 spam and legitimate e-mail messages from the 2006 
TREC spam corpus. We preprocessed the entire corpus by stripping HTML and non-textual 
parts and applying stemming and stop-list to all terms. The to, from, cc, subject, and 
received headers were retained, while the rest of the headers were stripped. Messages that 
had an empty body after preprocessing were discarded. Tokenization was done by splitting 
on nonalphanumeric characters. We did not take any measures to counter obfuscated words 
in the spam messages. Given that there are a large number of possibilities to disguise a 
word, most content-based spam filters will not be able to deobfuscate the text of a message 
efficiently (Carpinter & Hunt, 2006). Recently, an efficient complementary filter (Lee & Ng, 
2005) has been demonstrated to be able to effectively deobfuscate text with high accuracy. In 
practice, this type of technique could be used during preprocessing. 
For our experiments we sorted the e-mails in the corpus chronologically by receiving date 
and evenly divided them into 11 subsets { 111,...,DD }. In other words, the messages in subset 
n come chronologically before the messages in subset n+1. Experiments were run in an on-
line fashion, i.e., training on subset n and testing on subset n+1. Each subset contains 
approximately 3300 messages. The percentage of spam messages in each subset varies as in 
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the operational setting (see Figure 1). We used the Multiple Instance Learning Tool Kit 
(MILK) (Xu, 2003) implementation of MILR and the Weka 3.4.7 (Witten and Frank, 2000) 
implementations of LR, SVM and multinomial naïve Bayes, in our experiments. We reduced 
the feature space to the top 500 words ranked using information gain. Retaining 500 features 
appeared to be the best compromise among the classifiers in terms of improved efficiency 
and impaired performance. Attribute values for each message are calculated using the tf-idf 
(term frequency inverse document frequency) weighting scheme. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Percentage of e-mails in each data set that are spam. 
6.2 Good word list 
To simulate the good word attacks, we generated a list of good words using all the messages 
in the TREC spam corpus. We ranked each word according to the ratio of its frequency in 
the legitimate messages over its frequency in the spam messages. We then selected the top 
1,000 words from the ranking to use as our good word list. Generating the good word list in 
this manner has an important implication. Since the list was generated from the entire 
corpus rather than from the subset of messages used to train the classifiers, and since we 
represent e-mails using a feature vector of 500 features, some of the words in the list will not 
have an effect on the classification of messages that they are injected into. Such a list is more 
representative of the kind of list a spammer would be able to produce in practice, since the 
spammer would have no way of knowing the exact features used by the target filter. We 
noticed that in our experiments, only about 10% of the injected good words were actually 
retained in the feature vector, yet they had a significant impact on the classification. 
7. Experimental results 
We now present the results of two experiments in which we evaluate the effectiveness of 
our proposed multiple instance counterattack strategy. In the first experiment, we train all 
of the classifiers on normal e-mail (i.e., e-mail that has not been injected with good words) 
and then test them on e-mail that has been injected with good words. In the second 
experiment we train on both normal and attacked e-mails to observe how doing so affects 
classification of both normal and attacked e-mails. 
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7.1 Experiment 1: attacking the test set 
In this experiment, we tested the ability of the MILR algorithm, using the four splitting 
methods introduced above, to classify e-mail injected with good words. We also tested the 
single instance logistic regression (LR), support vector machine (SVM) and multinomial 
naïve Bayes (MNB) classifiers for comparison. The classifiers were each trained and tested 
on the eleven chronologically sorted data sets in an on-line fashion. That is, all of the 
classifiers were trained on the same unaltered data set nD , and then tested on the data set 
1+nD , for n=1...10. Fifteen variations of each test set were created to test the susceptibility of 
the classifiers to good word attacks of varying strength. The first version of each test set was 
left unmodified, i.e., no good words were injected. Half of the spam messages (selected at 
random) in each of the remaining 14 variations of each test set were injected with some 
quantity of random good words from our good word list, beginning with 10 words. With 
each successive version of the test set, the quantity of good words injected into half of the 
spam messages was increased: first in increments of 10 words, up to 50, and then in 
increments of 50 words up to 500. The injected words were randomly selected, without 
replacement, from our good word list on a message by message basis. We chose to inject 
good words into only half of the messages in each test set because, in practice, spam 
messages injected with good words account for only a subset of the spam e-mails 
encountered by a given filter. The precision and recall values on each version of the test set 
for all 10 test sets were averaged and recorded for each classifier. In our results, we use 
“MILRH”, “MILRT”, “MILRP” and “MILRS” where split-H, split-T, split-P and split-S were 
used with MILR, respectively.  
Figures 2 and 3 show how the average precision and average recall, respectively, of each 
classifier is affected as the good word attack increases in strength (that is, the quantity of 
good words injected into the spam e-mails in the test set increases).  
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Fig 2. Change in average precision as good words are injected into the test Set. 
From the results we can see that, with the exception of MILRT, each classifiers’ ability to 
correctly identify spam e-mail was significantly reduced as a result of the simulated good 
word attack. Of all the classifiers MILRT was most resilient to the attack, dropping by only 
0.3% (from 0.914 to 0.911) in average precision and by only 2% (from 0.901 to 0.883) in 
average recall after 500 good words had been injected into the test set. MILRH and MILRP 
stood up better to the attack than the single instance classifiers and the MILRS classifier, but 
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the attack still had a very noticeable effect on their ability to classify spam, reducing the 
average recall of MILRH by 27.1% (from 0.980 to 0.714) and the average recall of MILRP by 
29.2% (from 0.957 to 0.678). The average precision values of MILRH and MILRP dropped by 
7% (from 0.846 to 0.787) and by 5.7% (from 0.895 to 0.844), respectively. Of the single 
instance classifiers, LR was the most resilient; however, the attack still had a very significant 
effect on its ability to classify spam, reducing its average recall by 42.8% (from 0.966 to 0.553) 
and its average precision by 8.6% (from 0.909 to 0.831). The average recall of MNB and SVM 
dropped by 47.4% (from 0.914 to 0.481) and 46.2% (from 0.932 to 0.501), respectively. Their 
average precision values dropped by 2.7% (from 0.973 to 0.947) and by 6.9% (from 0.932 to 
0.868), respectively. MILRS turned out to be nearly as vulnerable to the attack as the single 
instance classifiers, dropping by 37.8% (from 0.961 to 0.598) in average recall and by 8.7% 
(from 0.885 to 0.808) in average precision. 
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Fig 3. Change in average recall as good words are injected into the test set. 
One thing that is clear from these results is that the effectiveness of our multiple instance 
counterattack strategy is very much dependent on the specific technique used to split e-
mails into multiple instance bags. The success of the split-term method (MILRT) is due to 
the fact that the classifier is able to consider both spammy and legitimate terms 
independently, since they are placed into separate instances in the bag created from an e-
mail. Under the multiple instance assumption, if at least one instance in a bag is spammy, 
the entire bag is labeled as spammy. When good words are injected into a spam message 
they end up in the legitimate instance of the bag and have no effect on the spammy instance; 
thus the bag still contains a spammy instance and is classified correctly as spam. 
7.2 Experiment 2: training on attacked spam messages 
In the second experiment, our goal was to observe the effect that training on messages 
injected with good words has on the susceptibility of the classifiers to attacks on the test set. 
As in the previous experiment, we tested each of the classifiers on the eleven chronologically 
sorted data sets in an on-line fashion. This time, however, in addition to creating 15 versions 
of the test set injected with increasing quantities of good words, we also created 5 versions 
of the training set. We injected 10 good words into half of the spam messages (selected at 
random) in the first version of the training set and then increased the number of injected 
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good words by 10 for each subsequent version, up to 50 good words for the fifth version. 
We also tried injecting larger numbers of good words, but after exceeding 50 words, the 
additional effect was minimal; therefore, those results are not shown here. For each version 
of the training set we tested the classifiers on the 15 versions of the corresponding test set. 
As before, good words were selected from our good word list randomly and without 
replacement on a message by message basis. For all ten tests, the precision and recall values 
on each version of the test set were averaged and recorded, separately for each of the 5 
versions of the training set. In the interest of space, the results of this experiment are 
presented in terms of average F-measure that is the harmonic mean of the precision and 
recall values, and only the results of the experiments when 10, 30 and 50 good words are 
added to some spam in the training set are presented. Figures 4-6 show the average F-
measure of each of the classifiers when 10, 30 and 50 good words are injected into half of the 
spam messages in the training set, respectively.   
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Fig 4. Change in average F-measure as good words are injected into the test set. 10 good 
words were also injected into the training set. 
From these results we can see that injecting just 10 good words into half of the spam 
messages in the training set appeared to lessen the effect of the good word attack for almost 
all of the classifiers (see Fig. 4).  Further increasing the number of good words injected into 
the training set continued to lessen the effect of the attack for all of the classifiers (see Fig. 5). 
After 30 good words had been injected into the training set, the presence of good words in 
the test messages actually began to increase the likelihood that such messages would be 
correctly classified as spam (see Fig. 6). These results confirm the observations of several 
other researchers (Lowd and Meek, 2005b; Webb et al., 2005) that retraining on normal and 
attacked e-mails may help to counter the effects of the good word attack. However, it is 
important to realize that this would only work in cases where the attacked messages being 
classified contained the same good words as the attacked messages that the spam filter was 
trained on. One of the major advantages of our proposed multiple instance strategy is that 
the spam filter need not be trained on attacked messages in order to be effective against 
attacks and further, that frequent retraining on attacked messages is not necessary for the 
strategy to maintain its effectiveness. 
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F-Measure with 30 Words Added to the Training Set 
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Fig 5. Change in average F-measure as good words are injected into the test set. 30 good 
words were also injected into the training set. 
F-Measure with 50 Words Added to the Training Set 
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Fig 6. Change in average F-measure as good words are injected into the test set. 50 good 
words were also injected into the training set. 
8. Conclusions and future work 
A multiple instance learning counterattack strategy for combating adversarial good word 
attacks on statistical spam filters has been presented. In the proposed strategy, e-mails are 
treated as multiple instance bags and a logistic model at the instance level is learned 
indirectly by maximizing the bag-level binomial log-likelihood function. The proposed 
counterattack strategy has been demonstrated on good word attacks of varying strength and 
has been shown to be effective. Additionally, we have confirmed earlier reports that 
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retraining on attacked as well as normal e-mails may strengthen a spam filter against good 
word attacks. One of the advantages of our proposed strategy, as demonstrated by our 
experiments, is that it is effective even when trained on normal e-mail and that frequent 
retraining on attacked messages is not necessary to maintain that effectiveness. We 
presented several possible methods for creating multiple instance bags from e-mails. As was 
observed from our experimental results, the splitting method used ultimately determines 
how well the strategy performs. The splitting methods we presented here work fairly well, 
especially the split-term method, but there are possibly other, perhaps better, methods that 
could be used. We plan to investigate other possible splitting methods in the future, and 
investigate the vulnerability of each splitting method in adversarial environments. In our 
experiments, we simulated the real operational environment where the adversary does not 
have a complete knowledge of the training data. We plan to investigate the effectiveness of 
our proposed counterattack strategy in the extreme cases where we assume the adversary 
knows the make-up of the training examples.  
Since it is an arms race between spammers and filter designers, we also plan to make our MI 
strategy adaptive as new spam techniques are devised, and on-line as the concept of spam 
drifts over time. In addition, we plan to investigate the possibility of extending the proposed 
multiple instance learning strategy to handle similar adversarial attacks in other domains. 
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